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1 Introduction
A number of capitalist democracies are characterized by 'macro-
corporatism'. For the moment leaving the extensive political science
debate on the nature of corporatism aside, this system has at least two
outstanding attributes: centralized bargaining between organized
capitalists and workers on important socio-economic topics and various
forms of interaction between state agents and representatives of these
groups. This paper elaborates the prospects and results of centralized
bargaining and the related role of the state.
Two different 'wage regimes' are introduced in this paper. It is
assumed that workers and capitalists are organized in trade u~iions resp.
employers' organizations which operate on several levels in the economy.
In most capitalist democracies, part of the labour force is member of a
sectoral or craft trade union. Firms are commonly organized in sectoral
employers' organizations. Especially in countries characterized by
1 In preparing this paper, I collaborated closely with Járg Glombowski.
Earlier versions were discussed with Joop de Kort, Marinus Verhagen and
members of 'Fachbereich polítische 0konomie, Darmstadt' as well as the
Dutch Union for Political Economy. All remarks and assistance are
gratefully acknowledged.
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corporatism, these organizations have nation-wide representatives:
federations of both trade unions and of employers' organizations. One
wage regime, the 'market wage regime', is characterized by bargaining on
the wage rate at, or below, the sectoral level. Since there are no
boundaries that obstruct intersectoral mobility of workers, it is
assumed that the employment rate is most important in determining the
growth of wages. Relations beLween workers and capítal.ists are of non-
cooperaLive natuce: given a Certain employment rate, workers try to
maximize the growth of wages. The second wage regime, 'the corporatist
wage regime', is distinguished from the previous one by centralized
bargaining between nation-wide representatives of organized labour and
capital. Bargaining of this kind comprises a certain elimination of the
labour market as determinant of the growth of wages. The goal of
resulting agreements is to increase the pay-offs for both capitalists
and workers.
This approach is the result of a critical notion of a set of
models reviewed by Glombowski and Wilke (1988) as 'game theoretic models
of class struggle'. Besides many crucial changes compared with these
models, this approach emphasizes the important role of the state in
establishing compromises between capitalists and workers. Therefore, it
is concluded that this approach is better suited for capturing some
aspects of the political system 'corporatism'.
In section 2, the basic model is introduced, containing a'market
wage regime'. For a given profit tax rate, a steady state growth path of
the economy is derived. Section 3 provides an analysis of the likelihood
capitalists and workers will try to switch to the 'corporatist wage
regime', or alternatively, start to bargain centrally on wages. In
section 4, an attempt is made to indicate the possible content(s) of the
'corporatist wage regime'. As will be made clear, the capitalist state
plays an important role here. The very essence of the 'corporatist wage
regime' contains its seeds for its breakdown. This is discussed in
section 5. Section 6 discusses parts of the implications of the model.
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2 The 'market-wage' regime
The basic model, containing the 'market wage' regime, strongly
resembles that of Goodwin (1967), and subsequent elaborations of it (see
e.g. Glombowski, Kruger (1987), (1988)).
In the model, income (Y) is linearly determined by the capital
stock (K), related to each other by a constant capital coefficient
(l~x):
K(t)~Y(t)-1~x (i)
The growth of the capital stock (pK)2 results from net investment (I),
pK(t)-I(t)
Net investment is a function of after-tsx profits ((1-T)P),
I(t)-a(t)[1-T(t)]P(t)
(2)
(3)
where a denotes the accumulation share of after-tax profits. 'T' is the
profit tax rate which is discretely set by the government. Profits that
are not accumulated are consumed. However, a is not considered to be a
strategic variable for the whole class. It is assumed that the
investment decision is an autonomous firm decision. Simplifying from
many factors, it is assumed that the accumulation share does not
fluctuate3:
2 The following notational conventions are used: t}ie gc~owth of variable
x(t) (-x(ttl)-x(t)) is -noted by ~x(t), and the growth rate of x(t)
(-[x(ttl)-x(t)]~x(t)) by x(t).
3 In an earlier version of this model, I formulated a dependency of the
accumulation share on the profit rate (p), where ~a~~p~0. Since this
effect made no qualitative difference with respect to the current
formulation, I did not introduce this dependency here.
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a(t)-~ 0~6~~ (4)
All wages are consumed: therefore investment is bounded by the amount of
after-tax profits. The wage share is defined as the fraction of total
wages in income,
~(t)-[w(Y,)L(t)]~Y(t) (5)
w(t) indicates the average real wage in the economy at time t, and L(t)
labour demand ( employment). Labour demand is determined by income (net
production) and labour productivity (y),
L(t)-Y(t)~y(t) (6)
Technological change is captured by the value of the growth rate of
labour productivity (y(t)) which is assumed to depend on the wage share.
A rising wage share implies higher labour unit costs. Consequently,
capitalists will, on average, invest in relatively labour saving
technology. This leads to a rising growth rate of labour productivity. A
specific Functional form that reflects this relation is:
Y(t)-mltm2a(t) mz)0, (7)
In the 'market-wage regime' wages are set at decentralized level.
The employment rate is supposed to be the only endogenous variable that
determines the growth rate of wages. Alternatively, wage formation
results from pure labour market forces, which leads to the label 'market
wa~;e rcrRime'. Ilowever, cupit.alfst democracics ure chnrrrcteriied by very
large dif'ferences of ttie structure of labour markets and even more
importantly, relative power of capitalists and workers. Such differences
are reflected in the wage level, or~and in the adjustment parameters of
wage growth to employment levels. Formally this amounts to:
w(t)--alta2~3(t) al,a2 ~0 (8)
5
The employment rate (S) is defined as the fraction of demand (L) and
supply (A) for labour,
g(t)-L(t)~A(t) (9)
Labour supply is assumed to increase constantly,
A(t)-n n~0 (10)
The last relations of the basic model define ( before-tax) profits,
P(t)-L1-a(t)7Y(t)
the profit rate,
P(t)-P(t)~K(t) (12)
and state expenditures (G) which are consumed, and financed totally out
of profit-taxes, implying a balanced budget condition,
G(t)-T(t)L1-aÍt)]Y(t) (13)
It is important to note that although government expenditures are
financed out of profit taxes, it does not imply that capitalists 'pay'
for all these expenditures. Since capitalists determine investment and
thereby the employment rate they are able to 'shift' eventual tax
increases to workers via the employment - wage growth relation of
equation (8). As will be made clear in the equilibrium values of wage
share and employment rate (equations (16) and (1~)), an increase in the
tax rate T implies a lower steady state wage share (see footnote 4).
The model discussed so far contains fourteen unknown variables.
One of these, the profit tax rate, is set discretely by the incumbent
political parties (government). The government is thus allowed to
manipulate the economy.
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This system can be reduced to two difference equations. First, an
expression for ~(Y.) is derived, using resp. (9), (10), (6), (~), (1),
(2), (3) ana (11):
g(t)-{It6KL1-T(t)]C1-~(t)]}~{Lmltm2~(t)tl][l.n]} - 1 (14)
Then, the growth rate of the wage share is expressed in terms of ~(t)
and ~(t), using resp. (5), (6), ( ~), and (8)
a(t)-{-a~a2~(t)tl}~{ml}m2~(t)tl} - 1 (15)
This system of two non-linear difference equations can be examined on
the existence of possible equilibrium values, and whether Lhe system
converges towards these equilibrium values, i.e. if for some reason the
economy is out of equilibrium; will it adjust itself to its equilibrium
values or not?
The equilibrium values of this system for a given T(t)-2`,
leading to ~(t)-~(t)-0 are:
a~-{i-[Itml][ltnJtóK[i-~~7}~{m2(ltn)taK[i-T~7} (i6)
ana,
p~-[ml}m2~M}alJ,a2
In the appendix, the stability of this system is analyzed.
Although no easy to interpret results are found, it is possible to find
relevant parameter values for which stability conditions are met. One
necessary (but not sufficient!) condition is that m2)0: if the growth of
labour productivity does not depend on the wage share, the system does
not converge to its equilibrium values.
Although it is possible for the equilibrium employment rate to
equal 1, it will be clear that no real existing capitalist society has
an inherent 'drive' towards full employment. However the logic of this
model 'forbids' an equilibrium full employment rate too, since otherwise
the growth rate of wages would be maximally equal to the growth rate of
labour productivíty (if ~max-~„-1, a2-m14m2~~;a1 and wmax-mltmZa~), and
consequently the wage-share would never be able to increase above its
steady state level.
Given the structure of' the steady state in the market wage
regime, the government can only influence the employment rate via the
mechanism of the wage-share indexed rise of labour productivity. It can
be shown that Aa"~~T ~ 0~, thus a lower profit tax rate results in a
higher wage share and consequently a higher employment rate: if m2~0?
But even if there is no feedback from the wage share to labour
productivity growth (m2-0), the government may still be able to have a
temporary positive impact on the employment rate if it lowers profit
taxes, but this effect fades away in time, since a rising employment
rate leads to a lower profit share (via eq. (8)).
In the structure of the 'market wage regime' the very powerful
position of firms becomes clear. A remarkable inference of the formula
of the steady state wage share (16) is that workers have no influence on
this outcome. As capitalists determine the volume of investment and its
characteristics (labour productivity growth) they own the most important
power resources of this economy. If workers become more powerful in this
regime (reFlected e.g. in a lower al), they will only temporarily
benefit from the consequences.
3 Regime switch
If g'(1, both capitalists and workers are capable of improving
their pay-offs, compared with the steady state resulting from the
market-wage regime. Suppose that workers try to maximize total wages
max
(~Y) in the steady state. Maximum output (Y ) in each period is
restricted by available labotir power: Ym~(t)-y(t)A(t). Real output in
each period is then Y(t)-y(t)p(t)A(t). In a steady state, y(t) and A(t)
4 This result is only possible if 1-(l.mlfm2)(ltn) ~ 0.
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develop independently from other variables in the model. Therefore,
workers might be assumed to maximize (if they can) their wage share in
the steady state: ~~3. Analogously, capitalists try to maximize profits
which leads according to similar reasoning to a maximization of (1-a)~.
In other words, p indicates some sort of utilization level of the
economy, of which both actors try to maximize their part.
~insert figure 1~
In figure 1, a~,p plane is drawn. Point A denotes the market-wage
regime steady state (~~,p"). Two curves are drawn, intersecting at A.
The curve BB' indicates an 'iso-utility curve' for workers along which
~S-a"p~ holds. All points lying in the north-east direction of BB'
contain combinations of ~,~ implying pay-off improvements for workers.
CC' represents its counterpart: the 'iso-utility curve' for capitalists,
(1-a)~-(1-~~)~~. Points north-west of the latter curve represent
improvements for capitalists. Consequently, both actors prefer the area
enclosed by ABC above the market-wage regime steady-state equilibrium
(a~`,g"). The asymmetry in the figure, CC' being steeper then BB', is
merely arbitrary; in the figure, a" is supposed to be larger then 0,5.
The important idea behind this part of the analysis is that for
both actors the market-wage regime steady state is not optimal, and
consequently Pareto-optimal improvements are possible, provided that the
market-wage regime, reflecting pure market power of both classes, does
not lead to full employment. However, it is one thing to argue that
Pareto-improvements are possible, and another to assert that such
improvements will be made. In this approach, a probability is formulated
which reflects the possibility that a wage-regime switch takes place.
At this part of the analysis, I assume that a"regime-switch" may
only take place if both actors recognize the existence of a steady state
combination of both unemployment (~w) and a specific income distribution
(~'). If the economy follows a cyclical pattern (e.g. a Goodwin growth
cyle), there hardly seems to be an incentive for the actors to change
important institutional characteristics of the economy. For example, if
the employment rate rises above the steady state level (in a market wage
regime), sectoral trade unions have no direct incentive to change
9
institutions of labour relations, since their market power is relatively
high: they are able to press for a growth rate of wages that exceeds the
growth rate of labour productivity ( see eq. (8)). Vice versa this
argument counts for capitalists.
But, as is argued in the appendix, it is certainly possible for
the economy marked by the 'market wage regime' to converge to the steady
state values of (a",g"). The following procedure is proposed to
establish whether the steady state is in force. Formally, one can
express d(t) as the weighted difference between both the actual
employment rate ~(t) and its steady state value p~, and the actual wage
share ~(t) and ~`:
d(t)-{[p(t)-p~]2t[~(t)-a"]2}0'5 (18)
If d is very small, one may conclude that a steady state is in force5,
thus if
d(t) ( E EER
t (19)
then t-T1, and a switch from T1 onwards to a centralized-wage regime may
take place. The probability that a regime switch from market-wage
formation to centralized bargaining takes place is notated by zl. zl is
a function of' time and a'maxi-mum probability of regime switch' (pl"):
z1-f(t.Pl")- 0 for t~Tl
[1-(ttl-T1)-1]pl" for t)T1
(20)
Where OCpl"(1.
Function zl captures a'learning process'. As time proceeds, the
chances of central agreements on wage developments increase. Normally in
5 To conclude this, the model has to be stable (i.e. converge to its
equilibrium values), otherwise it may be just as well possible that in one
period a(t) and j3(t) equal their equilibrium values and in the next period
ttl differ from these values.
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economic T.heory, subjects immediately come to an agreement if this would
benefiY. them both. But why do actors not immediately step to agreements
that benefit both of them? Centralized federations of trade unions and
employers' organizations must convince their members of the long run
benefits of central agreements, if there are any. Different
organizations of both classes or sections within the same organizations
do noL always have exactly the same interests. The steady staY.e
employment level and wage share are macro economic averages; between
different sectors there may be large differences; in some sectors the
labour market may be tighter: the trade union(s) in these sectors will
be reluctant to leave bargaining to a higher level. In other sectors
labour may be relatively abundant. Capitalists in this sector will
hardly ask for aid from their central organizations. Consequently it
will take time for centralized organizations to convince their members
of changing labour market institutions in order to improve the class
ínterests.
The state plays an important role in the establishment of a
corporatist regime by offering parties a suitable platform for
negotiations. Besides such a platform, the state may provide the actors
with information about economic indicators. If both actors trust this
information, it will help them to reach agreements and to persuade their
members. The ideological attitude of the incumbent political party(ies)
is therefore important in order to assess the chance of a regime switch.
A party attached to free market ideology will hardly commit itself to
provide support to central agreements between capitalists and workers.
Contrarily, a political party that wants to pursue 'social consensus' or
something akin will try to raise the chance for a regime switch to a
corporatist wage regime6. Other, more pragmatic considerations for
governments to support such a regime switch will be treated in section
6.
6 In model simulations, it may be conceived that political parties have
some impact on the maximum probability of regime switch (pl").
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4 Centralized bargaining, the state and the corporatist wage regime
It seems unlikely that central representants of the capitalist
class (i.e. the federation of employers' organizations) are able to
manipulate or bargain with the amount and type of investments. In
capitalist democracies, even in those which are characterized by strong
centralized federations of employers' and labour organizations, the
amount and type of investment is an autonomous firm decision~.
Consequently, in my view, the accumulation share is not subject to
centralized bargaining. Even if employers' organizations promise that
investment will relatively increase, trade unions will not believe this
as they know the autonomy of capitalist firms concerning investment
decisíons.
In the present model this means that equations (4) and (~) remain
unchanged in case of a'regime switch' to corporatism or, alternatively,
they are not subject to agreements. It may be possible for individual
firms to appreciate centralized agreements on wages and react on this by
investing larger part of their profits; "business confidence" increases
if corporatism is implemented. However, for the moment, I think this
type of argument is not well founded, since one may just as well reverse
reasons of "business confidence"8.
Consequently, centralized agreements only concern the wage rate,
or rather, the growth rate of wages. But both central organizations know
the reactions of individual firms on changes in the economic
environment: equation (3) expresses that firms invest a certain part of
their after-tax profits. As is clarified by (14), the employment rate
~ According to most literature on industrial relations (see e.g.
Gladstone and Windmuller (1984)), centralized employers' organizations
seem to have three main functions:
1 To represent interests of employers towards the state
2 To support their members with juridical and economic advice
3 To engage in collective bargaining on labour conditions
8 Firms know the goal of centralized wage bargaining: increasing the
employment rate. Therefore, they may fear consequent possible wage rises
of workers.
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can only increase if the wage share falls below its steady state level,
or if the government adjusts its tax rate. Equation (~) reinforces this
effect: a lower wage share implies relatively cheap labour power and
therefore induces the introduction of relatively labour intensive
investments leading to lower productivity growth and rising employment.
There are a number of possibilities to describe the corporatist
wage regime, i.e. the centrally made agreements on the development of
wages. However, an important criterium for a realistic and viable path
to a corporatist 'steady state' must be simplicity, since complicated
computations cannot be expected to be monitored and, if necessary, to be
adjusted. Another criterium for viable agreements must be their
feasibility: the development of wages must lead to economic meaningful
values. A third criterium is their attractiveness; the resulting values
of ~ and ~ should remain in the area ABC of figure 1.
A possible baragining outcome contains a temporary wage
moderation (w(t)([-altazg"] for a number of periods. After this period
of wage moderation, the growth of wages again should equal the (market-)
equilibrium growth of labour productivity. All features and parameters
of the model of section 2 remain unchanged except for equation (8):
'market'-wage formation is replaced by the above-mentioned 'rules'. A
numerical example of such an agreement is provided in table 1:
~insert table 1)
The stability of this outcome results from the endogenous growth
rate of labour productivity: during the periods of wage moderation, the
wage share falls leading to y(t) C m. If w(t) again equals m, ~(t) rises
which helps to stop a continuously growing employment rate. To
summarize, such an agreement contains three variables: the number of
periods workers have to moderate their wage claíms, the 'rate of
moderation' (the relative wage growth during the period of moderation
compared with the wage growth in a steady state market wage regime), and
the agreement that the growth rate of wages will not extend the growth
rate of wages implied by the steady state of the market wage regime.
A second form of feasible agreements requires the introduction of
a third actor in this setting, the government. The disadvantage of the
i3
previous agreement is the unilateral moderation from the part of
organized workers. Since investment cannot be part of the 'deal' ín a
capitalist economy, workers must moderate their wage claims, without the
security of individual capitalists sticking to their previous investment
behaviour. If capitalists decide on average to decrease relative
investment, workers have moderated their wage claims without reaping the
expected benefits, to say the least. But in this second type of
agreement, the state may temporarily reduce its profit taxes, if
centralized workers and capitalists have agreed to change their wage
setting behaviour: wages will not increase faster than the steady state
growth rate of labour productivity, implying a constant wage share.
Formally this means that in the model, equation (8) changes into:
w(t)--alta2s~. Given unchanged investment behaviour of capitalists, the
consequent rise in investment leads to a higher employment rate. For a
numerical example, see table 2.
~insert table 2~
The major advantage of the latter agreement is that the interests
of workers are not harmed (compared with the market wage regime), even
if capitalists would adjust their investment behaviour. The state looses
some of its tax benefits, but this may be offset as resulting from a
higher output level of the economy. The chances of breakdown of the
corporatist compromise seem smaller than in case of the first agreement.
These chances are the subject of the next section. Aspects of both type
of agreements may be combined. Resulting outcomes of tripartite
bargaining may include both a temporary wage moderation as tax
reductions. As can be expected, employment rate effects are stronger
here: see table 3.
Cinsert table 3)
5 The instability of centralized bargaining
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The eventual outcome of a process of centralized bargaining is
not stable itself. Only if centralized actors control their members,
i.e. their rank and file, sufficiently and the latter do not deviate
from the central wage agreements, this 'steady state' holds. But there
is now a'tight' labour market, in the sense that decentralized
organizations of workers are able to press for wage increases above the
growth of labour productivity. In fact, individual workers, or small
sectoral or craft trade unions face a collective action problem here.
For the whole working class, the outcome of centralized bargaining means
an improvement compared with the results of 'the market' (recall the
analysis of section 3 and figure 1). But decentralized units of the
working class face the incentive of increasing their wages above
centrally made agreements and neglecting subsequently presumably small
effects on the overall employment rate. This may even be stimulated by
individual firms which try to compete for relatively scarce labour
power. If a large number of 'free rides' occurs, centralized bargaining
will presumably not continue, since its effects are overruled.
Consequently, a reverse regime switch to the market wage regime may take
place here.
The probability of such a switch depends on several arguments.
Without pretending to be
arguments. First, employment
above the market-wage regime
increases above productivity
the higher the employment
switch taking place. But the
exhaustive, I will enumerate a few of those
plays an important role. Employment rates
steady state level provide chances for wage
growth. Following this line of reasoning,
rate, the larger is the probability of a
employment rate plays another role. If
centralized trade unions agree with the representatives of capitalist
firms on a moderate wage development in order to level up the employment
rate, they are, eventually, only capable to discipline their members if
the employment rate indeed rises. If it does not, for example if
capitalists on average invest less, the probability of a breakdown of
centralized bargaining will increase.
A second variable influencing the likelihood of the breakdown of
the corporatist wage regime is the wage share. A rise (fall) of the wage
share compared with its market-wage regime level will decrease
(increase) the probability of a regime switch. If the growth rate of
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wages actually lags behind the growth rate of labour productivity (i.e.
a fall of the wage share) the pressure on corporatist agreements will
rise.
The third variable is time. If the other instability arguments
longer prevail, if will be more difficult for the centralized actors to
control their members.
In order to formalize the preceding arguments to make computer
simulations of the model possible, I use a specific form that reflects
the arguments above. The probability of the breakdown of centralized
bargaining is defined as z2.
z2- 0 for tCT2 (22)
{0.5-o.5(tt1-T2)-itnl[I~(t)-(~"tn2)I]}{1-R3[a(t)-a"]}p2
for t)T2
where OCn2C(1-S~), OCp2C1 and T2 is the period of the corporatist
wage regime becoming effective. In the numerical examples of table 1 to
3, the development of z2 is given. It is important to warrant for the
arbitrariness of both equation (22) as for all of the parameters used.
In equation (22), (ttl-T2)-1 represents the factor 'time'. ~1 measures
the sensitiveness of z2 to departures of ~(t) from an employment rate
~"tn2. n3 represents the influence on z2 of variations of the wage
share. Of course, the absolute values of z2 in tables 1 to 3 provide
little information. Only their relative values do shed some light on the
probability of failure a specific outcome of the corporatist wage regime
has.
It is also possible to introduce an 'intermediate' regime of wage
Formation here. In this regime, the corporatist wage regime is broken
for one period by trade unions using their market power fully. Then, it
may be conceived that the centralized organization of the employers
checks whether cooperating to the corporatist wage regime still benefits
its members, or alternatively whether relinguishing centralized
bargaining on wages is perceived to be a bettr~r strategy. In the
structure of the model, capitalists consider whether their class is
worse off compared with the pay offs the steady state in the market wage
regime offers, thus whether (1-~(t))~(t)C(1-~")~~. If this condition is
16
fulfilled, it has no use for capitalists to engage in centralized wage
agreements anymore, and the corporatist wage regime is left altogether.
If not the federation of employers' organizations may give the
corporatist wage regime another chance.
6 Concluding remarks and additional carnnents
As formulated in the paper, both wage regimes carry their own
seeds for instability. In the model, the market wage regime leads to a
steady state which forms, in game theoretic terminology, a Nash
equilibrium; given the structure of the model, neither of the actors are
capable of unilateral strategy change in order to improve their pay-
offs. But the resulting steady state is pareto-inferior; which implies
that both actors have a stake in changing the structure of wage-
bargaining. The possible result of bargaining, the corporatist wage
regime, may be pareto-superior compared to the market wage regime, but
it is not a Nash-equilibrium: given the high employment rate,
decentralized units of workers and capitalists may drive the growth rate
of wages up.
An important feature of this approach is the dual notion oF class
organization. Workers are organized in trade unions (sectoral or craft)
and the trade unions are on their turn organized in a nation-wide
federation. Interests of the central federation and its joined trade
unions may collude but may also diverge. Divergence of interests and
problems of collective action may lead to the breakdown of a corporatist
wage regime. The organization of capitalists is often authorized by its
members to negotiate on wage (and some other general labour conditions).
But the members (firms) do not give up their autonomy with respect to
investment decisions. The type and amount of investments is theref'ore
not subject to centralized agreements between capitalists and workers.
The seemingly powerlessness of the centralized representatives of
capitalists is in fact their strength ("we cannot command more
investment efforts of our members, even if we want to")9. Still, the
outcomes of corporatist wage regimes are not without danger for
capitalists since a switch to the market wage regime means a temporary
relative low profit share.
As was made clear in the paper, interference by the state may
raise the possibility of institutionalising a corporatist wage regime
and may lower the chance of its breakdown, although it is neither
assumed that the state is able to enforce the corporatist wage regime
nor to prohibit a breakdown. This reflects the idea that corporatism is
a tripartite affair in its essence. In this last section, I want to make
some remarks on the arguments behind the likelihood of such state
behaviour in order to prevent critical comments on supposed functional
reasoning.
The capitalist state consists of different actors. All these
actors have their own interests or they represent interests of the 'non-
state' society. Resulting policies will reflect a weighted mix of
interests. The most powerful actors in the state probably are able to
have the largest impact on the policy of the state, but usually it is
very difficult (if possible at all) to perceive precisely which
combination of interests is determinate for the resultance of a certain
policy. To keep this discussion in reasonable limits, I restrict myself
to comment on the interests of political parties in persuing or
stimulating centralized agreements between capitalists and workers.
Usually, the main actors in the state are presumed to be
politicians, or rather political parties. Besides ideological
convictions, parties are interested in winning elections, whether they
are incumbent or not. Prosperous economic developments will help the
incumbent political party (ies) to win elections (and vice versa). The
9 See, in this context, the classical analysis on bargaining power and
strategy range of Thomas Schelling (1956). His main point is that
effective bargaining results from committing yourself to a strategy and
thereby forcing the opponent to give in. The real strategic aspect of
bargaining is the problem of committing oneself trustfully. The most
extreme way of strategic commitment seems to be a total lack of control on
the strategic variable: which then stops being subject to bargaining.
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employment rate seems to be an important economic variable influencing
electoral choice (see e.g. Frey, Schneider (1988), Hibbs (198~)). If
stimulating a corporatist wage regime will not strongly affect other
variables (like inflation, the wage tax rate or governmental
expenditures), incumbent political parties are li.kely to take a positive
stance towards this policy.
However, political parties have of course other means to
influence the employment rate. Especially conservative parties, attached
to fcee market ideology, will presumably try to weaken working class
power by e.g. changing laws on trade union competence ("union bashing").
In this model, changing of the rules could lead to a change of the
parameters of equation (8), for example a higher al: given a certain
eroployment rate, workers have less possibilities to demand higher wages.
This may lead to a higher steady state employment rate in the market
wage regime (see (1~)). Policies of the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations during the last decennium are better described by the
latter policy than by trying to promote a corporatist wage regime.
In general, it is important to acknowledge the (not novel!) idea
that the state has other means than 'classic' fiscal or monetary policy
options to influence to performance of the capitalist economy.
Institutions that regulate the functioning of the latter do not come
about in a'stateless' vacuum. As such, this discussion is part of the
ongoing debate whether economic policy of the state substantially
affects any real economic variable in the (medium-) long run.
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Appendix: The stability of the market wage regime
In this appendix, the stability of the equilibrium values of the wage
share (~) and the employment rate (S), implied by the system of
difference equations (14) and (15), is examined. For convenience (14)
and (15) are repeated here, slightly rewritten:
g(t}1) - f(~(t).~(t)) - {ltóx[1-t"][1-a(t)]}g(t)~{[mltm2~(t)tll[ltn]}
a(ttl) - g(~(t),~(t)) - {-alta2~(t)tl}a(t)~{ml.m2a(t)tl}
The system lb and 2b consísts of two nonlinear difference equations with
equilibrium values,
~~ - {mltm2~~ta1}~a2 and
a~ - {1-[itml][ltn]t6x[1-T"]}~{m2(ltn)t6x[1-T"]}
This system has stable equilibrium values (~~,~~), i.e. converges to
these equilibrium values, if initial points of reference are close to
these equilibrium values and if the characteristic roots of the Jacobían
matrix of the system above have moduli less than 1(see: Syds~ter, K.,
p. 415).
The Jacobian matrix (M') is:
~f(~(t).~(t))~~~(t) ~f(p(t).~(t))~~a(t)
I~g(p(t).a(t))~~~(t) ~g(~(t).a(t))~~a(t)
Where,
A' B'
C' D'
A' - {ltóK[1-T"][1-a(t)]}{[ml'm2~(t)tl][ltn]}-1
B' - {-~(t)dx(1-T")}{[mltmZ~(t)tl][14n]}-1-m2[1tn]{[mlfmZa(t)t1][ltn]}-2
C' - a2~(t){mltm2~(t)41}-1
D' - {-alta2s(t)tl}{mltm2~(t)tl}-1-m2~(t){-alta2~(t)tl}{mltm2~(t)tl}-2
For convenience, the following expressions are introduced:
zi
u - [mltmZa(t)tl]
~ - 6K(1-T~)
Then, in equilibrium,
[-alfa2~~t1] - CmltmZa"tl] - N
Now, for equilibrium values (~~,~~), A', B', C', D' can be rewritten,
A - {lt~[1-a"]}{~[ltn]}-1
B - {-~~~}{~[ltn]}-1 - m2[ltn]{~[ltn]}-2
C - aZ~~x-1
D - 1 - m2~~u-1
It can readily be checked that A, C)0 and B~O. If (mitl))0, D~O.
It can be shown that A-1, since,
u - {(m2tmitl)~tm2}{m2(lfn)t~}-1
n - {[1}~(i-a")]Cm2(l.n)t~]}{[(m2}mltl)~tm2][ltn]}-i ~
- {Cm2(1}n)t~]t~C(m2tmltl)(ltn)-1]}{C(m2tmltl)~tm27Cltn]}-1
~
- {m2t~(m2tmltl)}{(m2tmltl)~tm2}-1 ~
Now, the modulus of the characteristic roots ( ~) of matrix M can be
found
M-
A
C
BI
D
This can be done by setting
I(M-~I)I-0
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Which leads to,
~2-(AtD)~t(AD-BC)-0
~ - 0.5(AtD) ~ {[o.5(AtD)]2-(AD-BC)}0'S
For conveni-ence,
a - 0.5(AtU) and
b - {[0.5(AtD)]2-(AD-BC)}
If b(0, the modulus of ~(-at(-b)0'Si) equals
{a2t(-b)}0'5
{[o.5(AtD)]2-[o.5(A}D)]2t(AD-BC)}0'S
{D-BC}0'S, since A-1.
Now, the two main conditions for stability can be made:
I {D-BC}0'S ~ 1
II {[0.5(Dtl)]2-(D-BC)} ~ 0
Ad I)
{D-BC}o'S~1 ~
{D-BC}~i,
since for the negative roots of the expression above the
condition is always met.
Ad II)
[0.5(AfD)]2-ADtBC C 0
o.25D2-o.5Dto.25tBC ~ o
1-2(-BC)0.5~ D t lt(-BC)o'S
zi
Since we consider only economic meaningful values (m2~0), the relevant
area for D is,
1-2(-BC)o.5 ~ D
These expressions ma,y be decomposed in the origi.na] parameters, but then
bc~ceme I;~rge nnd do not of'fer very much insi};~ht. in Lh~~ sl,ructure of t.hc
problem. llowever, it seems Lhat the besL wa,y to interpret these results
(informally) is that a2 cannot be too large compared with m2, which
means that if wages movements react relatively fast on changes in the
employment rate and labour productivity growth reacts relatively slow on
changes in the wage share then the system becomes unstable. A necessary
conditioci for the system to be stable is that m2)0. Two numerical
examples are given that indicate a(un)stable system.
Example 1
p-0,16 a1-0.06
n-0.01 m1--0.0182
These parameter values lead to
u-1.o218 a~-o.8
(D-BC) - 0.9878 ~ 1
1-2(-BC)o.5 - 0.75628 ~ D (-o.y6o9)
a2-0.1
m2-0.05
p~-o.918
Therefore this system is stable.
Example 2
Now use the same parameter values as in example 1, except for,
a1-0.9 and
This leads to
u-1.o2178 ~~-0.8
a2-1
g"-0.9218
Now, D-BC-1.1101 ~ 1, therefore the system is unstable
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Numerical examples of the corporatist wage regime
The following parameter values are used:
x-o.5 ~-0.64 m1--0.1575 m2-0.25
T-0.5 n-0.01 a1-0.06 a2-0.1
p2-o.2 n1-7 ,~2-0.02 n3-5
This parameter structure leads to the equilibrium values:
a"-o.749 ~"-0.898
This system is stable, since (see appendix),
~-0.16 u-1.o298
D-o.818 B--o.371 c-o.o727 Bc--o.o27
Thus,
(D-BC) - 0.845 ~ 1 and,
1-2(-sc)o.5 - 0.671 ~ D.
Table 1: temporary wage moderation
In this example, for t-[1,3], w(t)-0.75(mltm2~~). For t-[4,-~~,
w(t)-(mltm2a~).
t g
1 0.899 0.749 0.025
2 0.899 0.744 0.077
3 0.9 0.74 0.094
4 0.904 0.736 0.l
5 0.908 0.738 0.097
6 0.912 0.74 0.094
7 0.915 0.742 0.091
8 0.918 0.743 0.09
9 0.92 0.744 0.093
10 0.921 0.745 0.096
25 0.925 0.749 0.106
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Table 2, temporary tax reduction
In this example, the z-0.75z'. during period t-[1,37. For t-[4,~), T-z~`.
t ~ ~` --- z.,i o.899 0.749 ó75
2 0.899 0.749 0.075
3 0.907 0.749 0.08
4 0.916 0.749 0.077
5 0.924 0.749 0.089
6 0.924 0.749 o.o9i
7 0.924 0.749 0.093
Table 3: temporary wage reduction and tax reduction
During t-[1.3], z-o-75z". and wÍt)-o.75~m1fm2~~). For t-[4.~). z-z~ and
wit)-~m1}m2a").
t g
1 0.899 0.75 0.025
2 0.899 0.744 0.077
3 o.9i 0.74 0.081
4 0.922 0.736 0.086
5 0.936 0.738 o.11i
6 0.94 0.74 o.i19
7 0.943 0.742 o.iz5
8 0.946 0.743 o.i29
9 0.948 0.744 o.i33
io 0.949 0.745 0.136
25 0-953 0.749 0.145
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